The period before the 1808-1809 war was a time of concern for Sweden. For Sweden, the new "Pomeranian war" (1805-1807) was not in any way a military success. When Russia-Austria were defeated by Napoleon at Austerlitz in December 1805 and the Prussians also were totally defeated the following summer, the Swedish situation got difficult. The troops of Napoleon invaded Swedish Pomerania, forcing the Swedish troops to withdraw to Rügen and Stralsund where they surrendered. Following the surrender, they were permitted to sail back to Sweden. The final catastrophe came when Alexander I of Russia signed a peace treaty with Napoleon in July of 1807. Earlier Russia and Sweden had been allies against France.
Napoleon now wanted to create a trade blockade against Great Britain with the help of Russia. Only Denmark, Sweden and Portugal traded with Great Britain at this time. But when Great Britain attacked Copenhagen in August 1807, Denmark joined France. Now Sweden was left alone. According to the treaty that Alexander I and Napoleon signed, Alexander now feels forced to declare war against Sweden.
When the Royal Russian army attacked Finland on the 21st of February 1808, it hoped to suprise the un-mobilized Finnish army during the time of year when the sea is frozen, making it impossible to send re-enforcements quickly from Sweden.
The Finnish part of the army was barely organized when it received orders to retreat to Osthrobotnia ( Österbotten). The rationale for the retreat was to avoid a defeat before spring when the Swedish part of the army could act.
Colonel Adlercreutz defeated the pursuing Russian troops with a suprise counterattack at Siikajoki and another attack at Revolax near Uleåborg. These victories demonstrated that the Finnish army was ready for a summer campaign. During the summer the now seasoned Finnish troops extended their control of Finland, reaching Lappo, Kauhajoki and Alavo.
"Fäderneslandet åt sina söner", film från år 2002, foto © Kaj Burman, Skellefteå
The Russians now knew their situation was extremely dangerous. Swedish re-enforcements could cut off their retreat to the south. Such a possibility was more than likely.
The only one who didn´t understand what the situation really demanded was the Swedish king. He believed that a small amphibious landing) and a farmers revolt was enough. The units he sent were far too small to ensure the final victory. When the Russians realised this, they decided to raise the stakes and sent more troops. The war was still winnable for Russia even though they had met unsuspected resistance.
The Russian invasion army had now doubled to over 50,000 men. The hard pressed Finnish army could no longer hold its position without help from Sweden. The Finnish troops were in bad condition. With uniforms threadbare and shoes almost nonexistent, many soldiers marched in rags and barefoot in the cold fall. The regiments had difficulties replacing their losses because the Russians by now controlled the more urban southern portion of Finland.
By the end of August a Swedish re-enforcement of 3,000 men arrived, but too late to change the situation. They were forced to join the retreating Finnish army which for the second time was pulling back to the north.
On the 13th of September, General Kosatschoffskij tried to cut off the retreat route to the north by marching to Jutas near Nykarleby where he later was defeated by the legendary Colonel von Döbeln.
The road was then open for the Swedish main force, commanded by Adlercreutz, which had arrived on the same day at Oravais. When Adlercreutz saw this place he realised that he here had a natural fortress. This was the place that the Swedish Army was going to give the enemy a bloody nose and keep him at bay. If Adlercreutz had any intention to engage in a final decisive battle the following day, he would not have sent two of his brigades further north. The remaining force of about 5,500 men slept in the village or in the woods by the fields.
About five o'clock in the morning on the 14th of September, the nearest Russian force, commanded by Colonel Kulneff attacked Adlercreutz' outpost at Lillträsk Creek.
Four companies from the Hälsinge regiment and three infantry regiments defended the position together with a section of cavalry from the Lif Company and two field cannon, commanded by the 15 year old Sublieutenant Wilhelm von Schwerin.
This was Adlercreutz' first fundamental error. Instead of pulling away troops at the outpost, he sent re-enforcements which lead to useless waste of life and ammunition in a terrain that offered little or no advantage. When Colonel Demidoff arrived with 2,000 men, the Russians almost succeeded in cutting of the Swedish artillery force. Young von Schwerin was successful in clearing a way for him and his men with his sword. He was then wounded with a bullet that gave him both a early death and a immortal name as one of the heroes in this war.
At one o'clock in the afternoon, the Russians begun their first attack on the main Swedish position after an hour long duel with Swedish artillery at this location. At the creek in the middle of the field, the Czar's army had to stop because at this time the water was too deep. While the Russian attack was being resisted, the Swedish western flank attacked but when the Swedes reached the base of the mountain, they had to retreat.
At three in the afternoon, Adlercreutz noticed that the Russians were re-grouping and were placing more and more troops on their right flank. He then understood that the Russians had realised that this was their only chance to avoid the Swedish western flank. In this situation Adlercreutz got the idea to try and repeat the success at Siikajoki with a fast attack on the Russian center and this way splitting the Russian forces in two. With the troops from the Uppland, Västmanland, Västerbotten and Österbottens regiments, he then attacked the Russians and was successful in splitting their forces and causing them to retreat to Lillträsk Creek where the battle had started in the morning.
"Fäderneslandet åt sina söner", film från år 2002, foto © Kaj Burman, Skellefteå
Now Adlercreutz makes his second fatal mistake. He follows the Russians too far. The Russian forces he earlier fought comprised just half of the forces that were in the area. The second part under the command of Colonel Kamenski, commander of the Russian forces in this part of Finland, was on the way to Oravais. Kulneff and Demidoff had lost faith in a victory and were preparing to retreat when Kamenski arrived. Kamenski, known for his cool analysis of situations, had shortly before taken part in a battle against Adlercreutz at Ruona where, despite a threatened defeat, he stayed at his position and was pleasantly surprised when he heard that the Swedes had retreated. By a small creek, the Swedes and Finns were receiving murderous fire and for the second time they were involved in a hard battle at a place with terrain that offered no advantages.
Now with more Russian re-enforcements, Kamenski can counterattack with full power - over 8,000 men. The Swedish troops were now out of ammunation and far away from their supplies. Some Swedes, unfamiliar with the terrain, became disoriented and were captured. Darkness toward the end of the day found Adlercreutz' troops had returned to their positions but units were now mixed with other formations and all being very tired and still having to cope with the lack of ammunition. Now it is getting darker and darker and they must defend their positions with bayonets and rifle butts. At ten o'clock at night, Adlercreutz withdrew his troops. After 15 hours of fighting they march all night to Nykarleby.
No flags or cannon were lost but the outcome of the war was the opposite. After the battle at Oravais, the Swedish-Finnish army was unable to conduct an offensive. This army retreated via the coastal road to Sweden and when the peace treaty was signed the following year, Finland had become a part of Russia.
Text: Ulf Smedberg & Göran Backman
Translation: Mårten Seiplax
Foto: Johannes Staffans
